Counterfactuals of divine freedom
Contrary to the commonly held position of Luis de Molina, Thomas Flint and others, I argue that counterfactuals of divine freedom ( CDFs) are pre-volitional for God within the Molinist framework. That is, CDFs are not true even partly in virtue of some act of God's will. As a result, I argue th...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 电子 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 载入...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| 出版: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2016, 卷: 79, 发布: 3, Pages: 185-205 |
| Further subjects: | B
Molinism
B Deliberation B Jesus Christ Divinity B Divine Freedom B Libertarianism B COUNTERFACTUALS (Logic) B MOLINA, Luis de, 1535-1600 B Counterfactuals of freedom B FLINT, Thomas B Middle Knowledge |
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Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| 总结: | Contrary to the commonly held position of Luis de Molina, Thomas Flint and others, I argue that counterfactuals of divine freedom ( CDFs) are pre-volitional for God within the Molinist framework. That is, CDFs are not true even partly in virtue of some act of God's will. As a result, I argue that the Molinist God fails to satisfy an epistemic openness requirement for rational deliberation, and thus she cannot rationally deliberate about which world to actualize. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-015-9542-1 |