Sit verum obligationes and counterfactual reasoning*
In the early 1980s, Paul V. Spade advanced the thesis that obligational reasoning was counterfactual reasoning, based upon his interpretation of the obligationes of Walter Burley, Richard Kilvington, and Roger Swyneshed. Eleonore Stump in a series of contemporary papers argued against Spade’s thesis...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Опубликовано: |
Brill
2015
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| В: |
Vivarium
Год: 2015, Том: 53, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 90-113 |
| Индексация IxTheo: | KAE Высокое средневековье NBE Антропология VA Философия |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Обязательства (логика)
B Counterfactuals B Counterfactuals obligationes sit verum B sit verum |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Итог: | In the early 1980s, Paul V. Spade advanced the thesis that obligational reasoning was counterfactual reasoning, based upon his interpretation of the obligationes of Walter Burley, Richard Kilvington, and Roger Swyneshed. Eleonore Stump in a series of contemporary papers argued against Spade’s thesis with respect to Burley and Swyneshed, provisionally admitting it for Kilvington with the caveat that Kilvington’s theory is by no means clear or non-idiosyncratic. In this paper, we revisit the connection between counterfactual reasoning and obligationes, focusing on one particular treatise, the anonymous early twelfth-century Obligationes Parisienses edited by L.M. de Rijk in the late 70s. We show that while positio in this treatise does not involve counterfactual reasoning, the species sit verum or rei veritas apparently does, and it is precisely this which distinguishes the two species in this treatise. |
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| Примечание: | Gesehen am 19.06.2017 |
| ISSN: | 1568-5349 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Vivarium
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685349-05301005 |