More Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
The counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) has several virtues, but it also faces serious problems. I argue that CCA is incompatible with the prudential and moral relevance of harm and benefit. Some possible ways to revise or restrict CCA, in order to avoid this conclusion, are...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2019]
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En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2019, Volumen: 22, Número: 4, Páginas: 795-807 |
Otras palabras clave: | B
Contrastivism
B Prudential reasons B Benefit B Counterfactual comparative account B Harm B Contextualism |
Acceso en línea: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Resolving-System) |
Sumario: | The counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) has several virtues, but it also faces serious problems. I argue that CCA is incompatible with the prudential and moral relevance of harm and benefit. Some possible ways to revise or restrict CCA, in order to avoid this conclusion, are discussed and found wanting. Finally, I try to show that appealing to the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals, or to the alleged contrastive nature of harm and benefit, does not provide a solution. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9931-5 |