Positive skeptical theism and the problem of divine deception
In a recent article, Erik Wielenberg has argued that positive skeptical theism fails to circumvent his new argument from apparent gratuitous evil. Wielenberg's new argument focuses on apparently gratuitous suffering and abandonment, and he argues that negative skeptical theistic responses fail...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado em: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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Em: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Ano: 2017, Volume: 82, Número: 1, Páginas: 89-99 |
(Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão: | B
Wielenberg, Erik J. 1972-
/ Teísmo
/ Deus
/ Ilusão
/ O mal
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Outras palavras-chave: | B
Evidential argument from evil
B Divine Hiddenness B Divine deception B Skeptical theism B Wielenberg B Parent analogy |
Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Resumo: | In a recent article, Erik Wielenberg has argued that positive skeptical theism fails to circumvent his new argument from apparent gratuitous evil. Wielenberg's new argument focuses on apparently gratuitous suffering and abandonment, and he argues that negative skeptical theistic responses fail to respond to the challenge posed by these apparent gratuitous evils due to the parent-child analogy often invoked by theists. The greatest challenge to his view, he admits, is positive skeptical theism. To stave off this potential problem with his argument, he maintains that positive skeptical theism entails divine deception, which creates insuperable problems for traditional theism. This essay shows that Wielenberg is mistaken. Although positive skeptical theism claims that we should expect the appearance of gratuitous evil (when there is no actual gratuitous evil) given Christian theism, this does not entail divine deception. I maintain that God is not a deceiver on positive skeptical theism because God does not meet two requirements to be a deceiver: (1) God does not intend to cause people to believe any false propositions and (2) God does not provide evidence for someone to justifiably believe a false proposition. Consequently, Wielenberg's new argument from evil fails and positive skeptical theism remains a viable response to the evidential argument from evil. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-017-9615-4 |