Scepticism, Truth, and Value
In response to Tad Brennan’s critical notice of The Demands of Reason, I offer further arguments in defense of the distinction between appearance and belief, the claim that truth for its own sake is the Pyrrhonist’s goal, and the centrality of the rationalist interpretation of Sextus’s work.
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Brill
2014
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| Em: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Ano: 2014, Volume: 4, Número: 1, Páginas: 51-62 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Pyrrhonism
Sextus Empiricus
belief
skepticism
reason
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| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Resumo: | In response to Tad Brennan’s critical notice of The Demands of Reason, I offer further arguments in defense of the distinction between appearance and belief, the claim that truth for its own sake is the Pyrrhonist’s goal, and the centrality of the rationalist interpretation of Sextus’s work. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Obras secundárias: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-04011146 |