The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments
It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real scep...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2017
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2017, Volume: 7, Issue: 2, Pages: 114-135 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Perception
/ Scepticism
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| Further subjects: | B
closure principle
radical scepticism
Dretske
perceptual reasons
indistinguishability argument
reasons identity thesis
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| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |