A Hume-Inspired Argument against Reason

In the \"diminution argument,\" which Hume adduces in the Treatise section \"Scepticism with Regard to Reason,\" he infers from our universal fallibility that \"all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.\&quo...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Weintraub, Ruth (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill [2019]
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2019, Volume: 9, Issue: 1, Pages: 1-20
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Hume, David 1711-1776, A treatise of human nature / Faith / Reason
IxTheo Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Epistemology
B Hume
B Reason
B Scepticism
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Summary:In the \"diminution argument,\" which Hume adduces in the Treatise section \"Scepticism with Regard to Reason,\" he infers from our universal fallibility that \"all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.\" My aim in this paper is, first, to show that on all extant interpretations of the argument, it turns out to be very weak, and, second, that there is in the vicinity a significant sceptical argument in support of the conclusion that all our beliefs are totally unjustified, an argument that cannot be easily dismissed.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20181321