Zalabardo on Pritchard and the Evidential Problem
It is an alleged virtue of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism (ed) that it makes available a promising line of resistance against the sceptic about perceptual knowledge. According to José Zalabardo’s reconstruction of it, however, this line of resistance—in particular, the solution it supplie...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Brill
2017
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| Em: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Ano: 2017, Volume: 7, Número: 3, Páginas: 199-205 |
| (Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão: | B
Zalabardo, José L. 1964-
/ Pritchard, Duncan 1974-, Epistemological disjunctivism
/ Epistemologia
/ Ceticismo
/ Disjunção lógica (Lógica)
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| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Evidential problem
epistemological disjunctivism
scepticism
epistemology of perception
Duncan Pritchard
José Zalabardo
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| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Resumo: | It is an alleged virtue of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism (ed) that it makes available a promising line of resistance against the sceptic about perceptual knowledge. According to José Zalabardo’s reconstruction of it, however, this line of resistance—in particular, the solution it supplies to what Pritchard calls the Evidential Problem—is ultimately flawed. Whether or not the solution criticized by Zalabardo is the one supplied by ed—which Pritchard has denied—my aim in this paper is to show that Zalabardo’s criticism of this solution fails. To begin with, I show that it is based on excessively demanding epistemic principles. Moreover, I argue that on a more plausible epistemic principle Zalabardo’s conclusion doesn’t go through. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Obras secundárias: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00001246 |