The Problem of Evil Remains Logically Binding
Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil assume that “logical” formulations of the problem are untenable, and that we should operate with “evidential” formulations instead. I argue that this consensus is founded on a mistake and that there is no legitimate reason to abandon logically bin...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
MDPI
[2021]
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Dans: |
Religions
Année: 2021, Volume: 12, Numéro: 3 |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Mackie
B evidential B Sterba B problem of evil B Plantinga B logical |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Résumé: | Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil assume that “logical” formulations of the problem are untenable, and that we should operate with “evidential” formulations instead. I argue that this consensus is founded on a mistake and that there is no legitimate reason to abandon logically binding formulations of the problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that, though it is possible to formulate a genuinely “evidential” problem of evil, logical formulations of the problem of evil are preferable in all cases. |
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ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
Référence: | Kommentar in "Sixteen Contributors (2021)"
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Contient: | Enthalten in: Religions
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel12030154 |