Defending the Free Will Defense: A Reply to Sterba
James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected position, as a non-theist myself, of defending the...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
MDPI
2022
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| Στο/Στη: |
Religions
Έτος: 2022, Τόμος: 13, Τεύχος: 11 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
James Sterba
B Free will defense B Alvin Plantinga B logical problem of evil |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Σύνοψη: | James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected position, as a non-theist myself, of defending the free will defense. In this paper, I will try to show that once we take care to focus on what the free will defense is trying to accomplish, and by what means it tries to do so, we will see that Sterba’s criticism of it misses the mark. |
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| ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Religions
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel13111126 |