The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments

It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real scep...

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Autor principal: Schönbaumsfeld, Genia 1973- (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
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Publicado em: Brill 2017
Em: International journal for the study of skepticism
Ano: 2017, Volume: 7, Número: 2, Páginas: 114-135
(Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão:B Percepção / Ceticismo
Outras palavras-chave:B closure principle radical scepticism Dretske perceptual reasons indistinguishability argument reasons identity thesis
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Resumo:It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the sceptical conclusion, this is not due to closure’s holding it in place, but because we’ve already been persuaded to accept a certain conception of perceptual reasons, which both issues a standing invitation to radical scepticism and is endemic in the contemporary literature. Once the real villain of the piece is exposed, it will become clear that the closure principle has been cast in the role of scapegoat in this debate.
ISSN:2210-5700
Obras secundárias:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-006011221