The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments
It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real scep...
Главный автор: | |
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Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
Язык: | Английский |
Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Опубликовано: |
Brill
2017
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В: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Год: 2017, Том: 7, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 114-135 |
Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
Восприятие
/ Скептицизм
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Другие ключевые слова: | B
closure principle
radical scepticism
Dretske
perceptual reasons
indistinguishability argument
reasons identity thesis
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Online-ссылка: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |
Итог: | It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the sceptical conclusion, this is not due to closure’s holding it in place, but because we’ve already been persuaded to accept a certain conception of perceptual reasons, which both issues a standing invitation to radical scepticism and is endemic in the contemporary literature. Once the real villain of the piece is exposed, it will become clear that the closure principle has been cast in the role of scapegoat in this debate. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Второстепенные работы: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-006011221 |