The Epistemic Norm of Blame
In this paper I argue that it is inappropriate for us to blame others if it is not reasonable for us to believe that they are morally responsible for their actions. The argument for this claim relies on two controversial claims: first, that assertion is governed by the epistemic norm of reasonable b...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2016, Volume: 19, Numéro: 2, Pages: 457-473 |
Classifications IxTheo: | NCB Éthique individuelle VA Philosophie |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Blame
B epistemic norms B Assertion (linguistique) |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Résumé: | In this paper I argue that it is inappropriate for us to blame others if it is not reasonable for us to believe that they are morally responsible for their actions. The argument for this claim relies on two controversial claims: first, that assertion is governed by the epistemic norm of reasonable belief, and second, that the epistemic norm of implicatures is relevantly similar to the norm of assertion. I defend these claims, and I conclude by briefly suggesting how this putative norm of blame can serve as the basis for general norms of interpersonal generosity. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9639-8 |