The Epistemic Norm of Blame
In this paper I argue that it is inappropriate for us to blame others if it is not reasonable for us to believe that they are morally responsible for their actions. The argument for this claim relies on two controversial claims: first, that assertion is governed by the epistemic norm of reasonable b...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2016, Volume: 19, Fascicolo: 2, Pagine: 457-473 |
| Notazioni IxTheo: | NCB Etica individuale VA Filosofia |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Assertion
B Blame B epistemic norms |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Riepilogo: | In this paper I argue that it is inappropriate for us to blame others if it is not reasonable for us to believe that they are morally responsible for their actions. The argument for this claim relies on two controversial claims: first, that assertion is governed by the epistemic norm of reasonable belief, and second, that the epistemic norm of implicatures is relevantly similar to the norm of assertion. I defend these claims, and I conclude by briefly suggesting how this putative norm of blame can serve as the basis for general norms of interpersonal generosity. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9639-8 |