On the Connection between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for those Reasons
According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to F then it must be possible that A should F for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-calle...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2016, Volume: 19, Issue: 5, Pages: 1211-1223 |
| IxTheo Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Schroeder
B Action B Practical deliberation B Williams B Normative reason B Reasons internalism |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to F then it must be possible that A should F for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-called internalist theories of reasons. In this paper I rebut an apparent counterexamples to Williams claim: Schroeders (2007) example of Nate. I argue that this counterexample fails since it underestimates the range of cases where agents can act for their normative reasons. Moreover, I argue that a key motivation behind Williams claim is compatible with this expansive account of what it is to act for a normative reason. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8 |