On the Connection between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for those Reasons
According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to F then it must be possible that A should F for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-calle...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
|
| Στο/Στη: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Έτος: 2016, Τόμος: 19, Τεύχος: 5, Σελίδες: 1211-1223 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCA Ηθική VA Φιλοσοφία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Schroeder
B Action B Practical deliberation B Williams B Normative reason B Reasons internalism |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to F then it must be possible that A should F for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-called internalist theories of reasons. In this paper I rebut an apparent counterexamples to Williams claim: Schroeders (2007) example of Nate. I argue that this counterexample fails since it underestimates the range of cases where agents can act for their normative reasons. Moreover, I argue that a key motivation behind Williams claim is compatible with this expansive account of what it is to act for a normative reason. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8 |