The Leverage Approach for Sufficiency?
Sufficiency principles generally state that it is especially important for justice that people have enough of certain goods, but it can be hard to give a convincing answer as to what level of goods counts as enough. This paper examines a recent sufficiency view by George Sher (2014), who argues that...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2016, Volumen: 19, Número: 5, Páginas: 1203-1210 |
| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | NCC Ética social VA Filosofía |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Justice
B Sufficiency B Sufficientarianism B Leverage B George Sher |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Sumario: | Sufficiency principles generally state that it is especially important for justice that people have enough of certain goods, but it can be hard to give a convincing answer as to what level of goods counts as enough. This paper examines a recent sufficiency view by George Sher (2014), who argues that the threshold level of resources and opportunities that the state should provide for each citizen is whatever level gives one enough leverage to obtain further resources and opportunities without inordinate difficulty or sacrifice. The argument relies on the idea that, with regard to resources and opportunities, the sufficient ability to live ones life effectively requires only that one have enough of them as leverage. While Shers general account regarding what counts as enough? is promising in countering certain challenges typically raised against sufficiency principles, the approach to determine the threshold of resources and opportunities in terms of leverage is problematic. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9726-5 |