The Leverage Approach for Sufficiency?
Sufficiency principles generally state that it is especially important for justice that people have enough of certain goods, but it can be hard to give a convincing answer as to what level of goods counts as enough. This paper examines a recent sufficiency view by George Sher (2014), who argues that...
Главный автор: | |
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Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
Язык: | Английский |
Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Опубликовано: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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В: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Год: 2016, Том: 19, Выпуск: 5, Страницы: 1203-1210 |
Индексация IxTheo: | NCC Социальная этика VA Философия |
Другие ключевые слова: | B
Justice
B Sufficiency B Sufficientarianism B Leverage B George Sher |
Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Итог: | Sufficiency principles generally state that it is especially important for justice that people have enough of certain goods, but it can be hard to give a convincing answer as to what level of goods counts as enough. This paper examines a recent sufficiency view by George Sher (2014), who argues that the threshold level of resources and opportunities that the state should provide for each citizen is whatever level gives one enough leverage to obtain further resources and opportunities without inordinate difficulty or sacrifice. The argument relies on the idea that, with regard to resources and opportunities, the sufficient ability to live ones life effectively requires only that one have enough of them as leverage. While Shers general account regarding what counts as enough? is promising in countering certain challenges typically raised against sufficiency principles, the approach to determine the threshold of resources and opportunities in terms of leverage is problematic. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9726-5 |