The Leverage Approach for Sufficiency?

Sufficiency principles generally state that it is especially important for justice that people have enough of certain goods, but it can be hard to give a convincing answer as to what level of goods counts as enough. This paper examines a recent sufficiency view by George Sher (2014), who argues that...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Lin, Zi (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2016]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2016, Volume: 19, Issue: 5, Pages: 1203-1210
IxTheo Classification:NCC Social ethics
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Justice
B Sufficiency
B Sufficientarianism
B Leverage
B George Sher
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:Sufficiency principles generally state that it is especially important for justice that people have enough of certain goods, but it can be hard to give a convincing answer as to what level of goods counts as enough. This paper examines a recent sufficiency view by George Sher (2014), who argues that the threshold level of resources and opportunities that the state should provide for each citizen is whatever level gives one enough leverage to obtain further resources and opportunities without inordinate difficulty or sacrifice. The argument relies on the idea that, with regard to resources and opportunities, the sufficient ability to live one’s life effectively requires only that one have enough of them as leverage. While Sher’s general account regarding “what counts as enough?” is promising in countering certain challenges typically raised against sufficiency principles, the approach to determine the threshold of resources and opportunities in terms of leverage is problematic.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9726-5