Avoiding the Conflation of Moral and Intellectual Virtues

One of the most pressing challenges facing virtue theorists is the conflation problem. This problem concerns the difficulty of explaining the distinction between different types of virtue, such as the distinction between moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Julia Driver has argued that only an ou...

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Autore principale: Wilson, Alan T. (Autore)
Tipo di documento: Elettronico Articolo
Lingua:Inglese
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Pubblicazione: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2017]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2017, Volume: 20, Fascicolo: 5, Pagine: 1037-1050
Notazioni IxTheo:NCA Etica
VA Filosofia
VB Ermeneutica; Filosofia
Altre parole chiave:B The conflation problem
B Intellectual Virtue
B Moral Virtue
B Virtue Ethics
B Virtue epistemology
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Riepilogo:One of the most pressing challenges facing virtue theorists is the conflation problem. This problem concerns the difficulty of explaining the distinction between different types of virtue, such as the distinction between moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Julia Driver has argued that only an outcomes-based understanding of virtue can provide an adequate solution to the conflation problem. In this paper, I argue against Driver’s outcomes-based account, and propose an alternative motivations-based solution. According to this proposal, intellectual virtues can be identified by the shared motivation for cognitive contact with reality, while moral virtues are identified by appeal to the characteristic motivations of kindness and justice. I defend the proposal by demonstrating that it produces plausible verdicts concerning the virtue status of candidate moral and intellectual virtues.
ISSN:1572-8447
Comprende:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9843-9