Acting Under the Guise of the Bad - Editorial Introduction
I introduce the topic of the Special Issue and highlight the central themes that the six contributors address in their essays. The moral-philosophical problem of the possibility of bad action is situated within the broader context of its action-theoretical significance, that is, as the most importan...
Auteur principal: | |
---|---|
Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
|
Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2018, Volume: 21, Numéro: 1, Pages: 1-3 |
Classifications IxTheo: | NBE Anthropologie NCA Éthique VA Philosophie |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Augustine
B Agency B Rationality B Bad action B Practical Reason B Kant |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Résumé: | I introduce the topic of the Special Issue and highlight the central themes that the six contributors address in their essays. The moral-philosophical problem of the possibility of bad action is situated within the broader context of its action-theoretical significance, that is, as the most important challenge to the influential idea that an intentional action is necessarily performed under the guise of the good. J. David Velleman's discussion of the character of Milton's Satan is mentioned to illustrate the Special Issue's main question of whether instantiations of individual and collective agency are conceivable that deliberately act for the sake of the bad. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9849-3 |