The Guise of the Guise of the Bad
It is undeniable that human agents sometimes act badly, and it seems that they sometimes pursue bad things simply because they are bad. This latter phenomenon has often been taken to provide counterexamples to views according to which we always act under the guise of the good (GG). This paper identi...
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2018, Band: 21, Heft: 1, Seiten: 5-20 |
| IxTheo Notationen: | NBE Anthropologie NCA Ethik VA Philosophie |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Desire
B Philosophy of action B Perversion B Guise of the good B Practical Reason |
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Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Zusammenfassung: | It is undeniable that human agents sometimes act badly, and it seems that they sometimes pursue bad things simply because they are bad. This latter phenomenon has often been taken to provide counterexamples to views according to which we always act under the guise of the good (GG). This paper identifies several distinct arguments in favour of the possibility that one can act under the guise of the bad. GG seems to face more serious difficulties when trying to answer three different, but related, arguments for the possibility of acting under the guise of the bad. The main strategies available to answer these objections end up either undermining the motivation for GG or failing to do full justice to the nature of perverse motivation. However, these difficulties turn out to be generated by focusing on a particular version of GG, what I call the content version. But we have independent reasons to prefer a different version of GG; namely, the attitude version. The attitude version allows for a much richer understanding of the possibility of acting on what we conceive to be bad. Drawing on an analogy with theoretical akrasia and theoretical perversion, I try to show how the attitude version can provide a compelling account of perverse actions. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9855-5 |