Richard Kilvington and the Theory of Obligations
Kretzmann and Spade were led by Richard Kilvington’s proposed revisions to the rules of obligations in his discussion of the 47th sophism in his Sophismata to claim that the purpose of obligational disputations was the same as that of counterfactual reasoning. Angel d’Ors challenged this interpretat...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Brill
2015
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| En: |
Vivarium
Año: 2015, Volumen: 53, Número: 2/4, Páginas: 391-404 |
| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | KAF Baja Edad Media VA Filosofía |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Obligations
sophisms
ex impossibili quodlibet
Kilvington
Burley
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| Acceso en línea: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |
| Sumario: | Kretzmann and Spade were led by Richard Kilvington’s proposed revisions to the rules of obligations in his discussion of the 47th sophism in his Sophismata to claim that the purpose of obligational disputations was the same as that of counterfactual reasoning. Angel d’Ors challenged this interpretation, realising that the reason for Kilvington’s revision was precisely that he found the art of obligation unsuited to the kind of reasoning that lay at the heart of the sophismatic argument. In his criticism, Kilvington focused on a technique used by Walter Burley to force a respondent to grant an arbitrary falsehood and similar to Lewis and Langford’s famous defence of ex impossibili quodlibet. Kilvington observed that just as in obligational disputation one may be obliged to grant a false proposition and deny a true one, so in counterfactual reasoning one may be obliged to doubt a proposition whose truth or falsity one knows, on pain of contradiction. |
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| ISSN: | 1568-5349 |
| Obras secundarias: | In: Vivarium
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341306 |