Compunction, Second-Personal Morality, and Moral Reasons
In The Second-Person Standpoint and subsequent essays, Stephen Darwall develops an account of morality that is second-personal in virtue of holding that what we are morally obligated to do is what others can legitimately demand that we do, i.e., what they can hold us accountable for doing through...
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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| En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2018, Volumen: 21, Número: 3, Páginas: 719-733 |
| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | NCA Ética VA Filosofía |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Second-personal morality
B Second-personal reasons B Darwall B Reactive attitudes B Compunction B Moral Reasons B Stephen |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Sumario: | In The Second-Person Standpoint and subsequent essays, Stephen Darwall develops an account of morality that is second-personal in virtue of holding that what we are morally obligated to do is what others can legitimately demand that we do, i.e., what they can hold us accountable for doing through moral reactive attitudes like blame. Similarly, what it would be wrong for us to do is what others can legitimately demand that we abstain from doing. As part of this account, Darwall argues for the proposition that we have a distinctive second-personal reason to fulfill all of our obligations and to avoid all wrong-actions, an authority-regarding reason that derives from the legitimate demands the moral community makes of us. I show that Darwall offers an insufficient case for this proposition. My criticism of this aspect of Darwall's account turns in part on the fact that we have compunction-based or compunctive reasons to fulfill all of our obligations and to avoid all wrong actions, a type of reason that Darwall seemingly overlooks. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9918-2 |