Robust Individual Responsibility for Climate Harms
According to some scholars, while sets of greenhouse gases emissions generate harms deriving from climate change, which can be mitigated through collective actions, individual emissions and mitigation activities seem to be causally insufficient to cause harms. If so, single individuals are neither r...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Опубликовано: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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| В: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Год: 2018, Том: 21, Выпуск: 4, Страницы: 811-823 |
| Индексация IxTheo: | NCB Индивидуальная этика NCG Экологическая этика; этика мироздания VA Философия |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Frankfurt
B Shue B Possible Worlds B Climate Change B Causation B luxury emissions / Subsistence B Responsibility |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Итог: | According to some scholars, while sets of greenhouse gases emissions generate harms deriving from climate change, which can be mitigated through collective actions, individual emissions and mitigation activities seem to be causally insufficient to cause harms. If so, single individuals are neither responsible for climate harms, nor they have mitigation duties. If this view were true, there would be collective responsibility for climate harms without individual responsibility and collective mitigation duties without individual duties: this is puzzling. This paper explores a way to solve this puzzle. First, it will be argued that individual emissions, though not proper and full-fledged causes, causally contribute to raise the probability of climate harms. As a consequence, individuals are in fact responsible for their expected contributions to climate harms - this is contributive responsibility for likely outcomes. Second, it will be argued that people have responsibility also for the possible impacts of their individual emissions on climate harms. People can plausibly be regarded as individually responsible for the possible outcomes of their actions in close possible alternative worlds - this is robust responsibility. Non-causal individual responsibility for climate harms is plausible, and the puzzle may be solved. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9915-5 |