Responsibility for Killer Robots
Future weapons will make life-or-death decisions without a human in the loop. When such weapons inflict unwarranted harm, no one appears to be responsible. There seems to be a responsibility gap. I first reconstruct the argument for such responsibility gaps to then argue that this argument is not so...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2019]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Έτος: 2019, Τόμος: 22, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 731-747 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCD Πολιτική Ηθική NCJ Επιστημονική Ηθική VA Φιλοσοφία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Hierarchical groups
B Moral Philosophy B Artificial Intelligence B Causation B Moral Responsibility B Responsibility gap |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Σύνοψη: | Future weapons will make life-or-death decisions without a human in the loop. When such weapons inflict unwarranted harm, no one appears to be responsible. There seems to be a responsibility gap. I first reconstruct the argument for such responsibility gaps to then argue that this argument is not sound. The argument assumes that commanders have no control over whether autonomous weapons inflict harm. I argue against this assumption. Although this investigation concerns a specific case of autonomous weapons systems, I take steps towards vindicating the more general idea that superiors can be morally responsible in virtue of being in command. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-019-10007-9 |