Agatheology and naturalisation of the discourse on evil
This article argues that the existence of horrendous evil calls into question not just the plausibility of the most popular theodicies on offer, notably sceptical theism, but the coherence of any agatheology-that is, any theology which identifies God or the ultimate reality with the ultimate good (t...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονικά/Εκτύπωση Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Taylor & Francis
[2017]
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| Στο/Στη: |
International journal of philosophy and theology
Έτος: 2017, Τόμος: 78, Τεύχος: 4/5, Σελίδες: 469-484 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Θεός (μοτίβο)
/ Το Καλό
/ Το Κακό
/ Θεοδικία (μοτίβο)
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| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NBC Δόγμα του Θεού |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
agatheism
B agathological rationality B agatheology B Theodicy of justice asfairness B agathological imagination B Agatheos |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | This article argues that the existence of horrendous evil calls into question not just the plausibility of the most popular theodicies on offer, notably sceptical theism, but the coherence of any agatheology-that is, any theology which identifies God or the ultimate reality with the ultimate good (to agathon in Greek) or with a maximally good being (Agatheos). The article contends that the only way an agatheologian can ‘save the face of God’ after Auschwitz and Kolyma is by endorsing a non-interventionist interpretation of the Divine providence which will amount to naturalisation of the discourse on evil by localising entirely in nature the causes of evil and the possible ways of its prevention. ‘Theodicy of justice as fairness’ is then presented as consistent with such naturalistic account of evils and yet compatible with a religious worldview. It justifies the Divine non-intervention by suggesting that it would not be just or fair for God to intervene on only some occasions to avert evil, if God is apparently prevented from intervening in all such cases (and we can think of good reasons why this is so). Since for Agatheos it is metaphysically impossible to do what is unjust or unfair, God never intervenes to avert evil. |
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| ISSN: | 2169-2327 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2017.1387075 |