Incarnation, Divine Timelessness, and Modality
A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is that the Son of God ‘becomes' incarnate. Furthermore, according to classical theism, God is timeless: He exists ‘outside' of time, and His life has no temporal stages. A consequence of this ‘atemporalist' view is that a ti...
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| Altri autori: | |
| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain
[2019]
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| In: |
TheoLogica
Anno: 2019, Volume: 3, Fascicolo: 1, Pagine: 88-112 |
| Notazioni IxTheo: | NBC Dio NBF Cristologia VA Filosofia |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Incarnation
B Divine Freedom B Atemporality B Son of God B Modality |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Riepilogo: | A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is that the Son of God ‘becomes' incarnate. Furthermore, according to classical theism, God is timeless: He exists ‘outside' of time, and His life has no temporal stages. A consequence of this ‘atemporalist' view is that a timeless being cannot undergo intrinsic change—for this requires the being to be one way at one time, and a different way at a later time. How, then, can we understand the central Christian claim that the Son of God ‘becomes' human? This paper examines one such explanation, drawn from a brief remark by Brian Leftow: the Word takes on flesh by exhibiting modal variation with regards to the incarnation. On this account, a timeless God ‘becomes' incarnate simply due to variation across logical space: at some possible worlds He is incarnate and at others He is not. Modal variation need not, therefore, require temporality: it only requires variation across (static) possible worlds. I draw out the problems with Leftow's modal claim under the heads of Ersatzism and Genuine Modal Realism about possible worlds, respectively. I argue that in both instances, Leftow's desired cross-worldly variation of the Son's incarnation cannot be achieved. |
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| ISSN: | 2593-0265 |
| Riferimento: | Kritik in "On Emily Paul on Brian Leftow (2019)"
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| Comprende: | Enthalten in: TheoLogica
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.14428/thl.v2i3.2283 |