Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust
In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone en...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 电子 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 载入...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| 出版: |
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain
[2018]
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| In: |
TheoLogica
Year: 2018, 卷: 2, 发布: 1, Pages: 84-94 |
| IxTheo Classification: | HB Old Testament NBE Anthropology VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Effects of Sin
B The Fall B Analytic Theology B Original Sin B Epistemic Self-trust |
| 在线阅读: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| 总结: | In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument. |
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| ISSN: | 2593-0265 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: TheoLogica
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.14428/thl.v0i0.1303 |