Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust
In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone en...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain
[2018]
|
| Στο/Στη: |
TheoLogica
Έτος: 2018, Τόμος: 2, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 84-94 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | ΗΒ Παλαιά Διαθήκη NBE Ανθρωπολογία VA Φιλοσοφία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Effects of Sin
B The Fall B Analytic Theology B Original Sin B Epistemic Self-trust |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Σύνοψη: | In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2593-0265 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: TheoLogica
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.14428/thl.v0i0.1303 |