Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust
In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone en...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado: |
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain
[2018]
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En: |
TheoLogica
Año: 2018, Volumen: 2, Número: 1, Páginas: 84-94 |
Clasificaciones IxTheo: | HB Antiguo Testamento NBE Antropología VA Filosofía |
Otras palabras clave: | B
Effects of Sin
B The Fall B Analytic Theology B Original Sin B Epistemic Self-trust |
Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Sumario: | In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument. |
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ISSN: | 2593-0265 |
Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: TheoLogica
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.14428/thl.v0i0.1303 |