Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust

In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone en...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Rutledge, Jonathan C. (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
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Publicado: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain [2018]
En: TheoLogica
Año: 2018, Volumen: 2, Número: 1, Páginas: 84-94
Clasificaciones IxTheo:HB Antiguo Testamento
NBE Antropología
VA Filosofía
Otras palabras clave:B Effects of Sin
B The Fall
B Analytic Theology
B Original Sin
B Epistemic Self-trust
Acceso en línea: Volltext (doi)
Volltext (kostenfrei)
Descripción
Sumario:In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument.
ISSN:2593-0265
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: TheoLogica
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.14428/thl.v0i0.1303