Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust

In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone en...

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Главный автор: Rutledge, Jonathan C. (Автор)
Формат: Электронный ресурс Статья
Язык:Английский
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Опубликовано: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain [2018]
В: TheoLogica
Год: 2018, Том: 2, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 84-94
Индексация IxTheo:HB Ветхий Завет
NBE Антропология
VA Философия
Другие ключевые слова:B Effects of Sin
B The Fall
B Analytic Theology
B Original Sin
B Epistemic Self-trust
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Итог:In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument.
ISSN:2593-0265
Второстепенные работы:Enthalten in: TheoLogica
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.14428/thl.v0i0.1303