The modal-epistemic argument for the existence of God is flawed
In a recent article, Emanuel Rutten has presented a novel argument for the existence of God, defined as a personal being that is the first cause of reality. An interesting feature of the argument, which caused quite a stir, is that it does not fall within any of the traditional categories of argumen...
Autor principal: | |
---|---|
Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado em: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
|
Em: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Ano: 2018, Volume: 84, Número: 3, Páginas: 307-322 |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
Modal-epistemic argument
B Personal first cause B Rutten B God |
Acesso em linha: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Resolving-System) |
Resumo: | In a recent article, Emanuel Rutten has presented a novel argument for the existence of God, defined as a personal being that is the first cause of reality. An interesting feature of the argument, which caused quite a stir, is that it does not fall within any of the traditional categories of arguments for God's existence. Rutten calls his argument a modal-epistemic one, which reflects the fact that the first premise of his argument states that all possible truths are knowable. The main purpose of this article is a simple one: to point out that Rutten's modal-epistemic argument is flawed. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-018-9664-3 |