The incoherence of divine possibility constructivism

Before God created did God have ideas in mind for particular things, kinds of things, properties of things, particular events, and laws of nature? At least since Augustine, theists have proposed differing answers. This paper is about a relatively recent theory, which holds that God constructs them w...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schultz, Walter J. 1950- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2019]
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2019, Volume: 85, Issue: 3, Pages: 347-361
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B God / Creation / Constructivism (Philosophy)
IxTheo Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
NBC Doctrine of God
NBD Doctrine of Creation
Further subjects:B Brian Leftow
B Hugh McCann
B Divine Ideas
B Origin of possibility
B James Ross
Online Access: Volltext (Resolving-System)
Description
Summary:Before God created did God have ideas in mind for particular things, kinds of things, properties of things, particular events, and laws of nature? At least since Augustine, theists have proposed differing answers. This paper is about a relatively recent theory, which holds that God constructs them when he creates the universe. James Ross, Brian Leftow, and Hugh McCann are its primary advocates. Since the shared features of their views do not pertain to the so-called "abstract objects" or to the "necessary truths" of mathematics and logic, let us call this "divine possibility constructivism" (DPC), differentiating it from the theistic activism of Christopher Menzel and Thomas Morris and from the voluntarism of René Descartes-both of which could otherwise be construed as "constructivist". According to Ross, Leftow, and McCann, God had nothing in mind before he created-which is to say that, before God created, God was not aware of possibilities for a universe. Rather, God's being aware of any such possibilities is grounded only in God's having constructed them ex nihilo. This paper shows that DPC is incoherent.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-018-9682-1