The Varieties of Physicalist Ontology

This paper brings Alfred North Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism into conversation with the recent panpsychist turn in analytic philosophy of mind. Whitehead's unabashedly metaphysical project broadly aligns with recent critiques of reductive physicalism and the turn toward a conception o...

Description complète

Enregistré dans:  
Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Segall, Matthew T. (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
En cours de chargement...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publié: Mohr Siebeck [2020]
Dans: Philosophy, theology and the sciences
Année: 2020, Volume: 7, Numéro: 1, Pages: 105-131
Classifications IxTheo:CF Christianisme et science
VA Philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B Experience
B Process-relational philosophy
B Consciousness
B Emergence
B Panpsychism
B Physicalism
B Panexperientialism
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Resolving-System)
Description
Résumé:This paper brings Alfred North Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism into conversation with the recent panpsychist turn in analytic philosophy of mind. Whitehead's unabashedly metaphysical project broadly aligns with recent critiques of reductive physicalism and the turn toward a conception of experience as basic to Nature. This paper thus examines physicalism's dominant strategies for explaining consciousness, including eliminativism, epiphenomenalism, and emergentism, and concludes that the panpsychist alternative is superior. However, Whitehead's process-relational panexperientialism diverges in crucial respects from the dominant substance-property variants of panpsychism. I argue that Whitehead's version avoids many of the conceptual difficulties plaguing the latter and that it thus represents a more formidable alternative to standard physicalism.
ISSN:2197-2834
Contient:Enthalten in: Philosophy, theology and the sciences
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1628/ptsc-2020-0008