On justifying arguments of species membership
In the debate about the moral status of human beings at the margins of life, arguments of species membership are often considered to be the least plausible ones. Against this backdrop, this article explores two possible ways to formulate feasible arguments of species membership. The first is an (in...
主要作者: | |
---|---|
格式: | 电子 文件 |
语言: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
出版: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2020]
|
In: |
Bioethics
Year: 2020, 卷: 34, 发布: 2, Pages: 159-165 |
IxTheo Classification: | NBE Anthropology NCA Ethics |
Further subjects: | B
Moral Status
B Speciesism B 个人 B 脴胎 B life form B Species B Recognition |
在线阅读: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
总结: | In the debate about the moral status of human beings at the margins of life, arguments of species membership are often considered to be the least plausible ones. Against this backdrop, this article explores two possible ways to formulate feasible arguments of species membership. The first is an (in the broadest sense of the word) Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian argument; the second is an argument from the intrinsic logic of human rights, which Robert Spaemann refers toas a ‘transcendental-pragmatic’ argument. On these grounds, the article proposes a philosophical justification for an at least moderate speciesism. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12657 |