Divorce, Disorientation, and Remarriage
This paper asks three inter-related questions, proceeding chronologically through a divorcee’s experience: (i) is it responsible and rational to make an unconditional marital vow in the first place? (ii) does divorce break that unconditional marital vow? And the main question: (iii) can the divorcee...
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2020]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2020, Volume: 23, Fascicolo: 3/4, Pagine: 531-544 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Divorce
B Disorientation B Promises B Marriage |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Riepilogo: | This paper asks three inter-related questions, proceeding chronologically through a divorcee’s experience: (i) is it responsible and rational to make an unconditional marital vow in the first place? (ii) does divorce break that unconditional marital vow? And the main question: (iii) can the divorcee make a second unconditional marital vow in all moral seriousness? To the last question I answer yes. I argue that the divorce process is so disorienting - to use Amy Harbin’s term - as to transform the divorcee and therefore partly release her from the original vow. Arguing this will require a specific understanding of personal identity and change. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-019-10036-4 |