Scepticism and Self-Detachment

Abstract This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic...

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1. VerfasserIn: Perin, Casey (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Brill 2020
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2020, Band: 10, Heft: 3/4, Seiten: 235-255
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Sextus, Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae institutiones / Skeptizismus / Selbst / Distanz
IxTheo Notationen:AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B Tranquility
B self-detachment
B psychological unity
B suspension of judgment
B apraxia argument
B Scepticism
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Zusammenfassung:Abstract This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic faces a dilemma: either he is more detached from himself than the non-Sceptic or he is vulnerable to a non-standard version of the apraxia objection.
ISSN:2210-5700
Enthält:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10011