Scepticism and Self-Detachment
Abstract This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic...
1. VerfasserIn: | |
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Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Veröffentlicht: |
Brill
2020
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2020, Band: 10, Heft: 3/4, Seiten: 235-255 |
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Sextus, Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae institutiones
/ Skeptizismus
/ Selbst
/ Distanz
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IxTheo Notationen: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus VA Philosophie |
weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Tranquility
B self-detachment B psychological unity B suspension of judgment B apraxia argument B Scepticism |
Online Zugang: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (Verlag) |
Zusammenfassung: | Abstract This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic faces a dilemma: either he is more detached from himself than the non-Sceptic or he is vulnerable to a non-standard version of the apraxia objection. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Enthält: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10011 |