Wie kausal ist menschliches Handeln?: Grenzen in der Naturalisierung menschlichen Handelns
This article argues that the causal theory of action cannot explain conscious human action adequately. Interpreting actions as bodily movements caused by (mental) states internai to the agent does not do justice to the particular role of the agent herself as >performing< or >bringing about&...
| Subtitles: | Christliches Menschenbild und Naturalismus$dPhilosophische Standortbestimmungen |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Echter
2011
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| In: |
Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie
Year: 2011, Volume: 133, Issue: 3/4, Pages: 361-381 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | This article argues that the causal theory of action cannot explain conscious human action adequately. Interpreting actions as bodily movements caused by (mental) states internai to the agent does not do justice to the particular role of the agent herself as >performing< or >bringing about< the action in the light of specific reasons. The only thing one can say about actions being distinct from other bodily movements such as automatic physiological processes or reflexes will employ again the concept of action, that is, of the agent doing something consciously. For this reason I argue to consider the concept of conscious action, respectively human agency as a basic concept. It refers to the distinctive capacity of human persons to perform actions consciously which cannot be reduced to other phenomena within the agent. If this view of human agency is correct, it sets limits to attempts of naturalising the human person. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie
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