Quasi-Psychologism about Collective Intention

This paper argues that a class of popular views of collective intention, which I call “quasi-psychologism”, faces a problem explaining common intuitions about collective action. Views in this class hold that collective intentions are realized in or constituted by individual, mental, participatory in...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Rachar, Matthew (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2021
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2021, Volume: 24, Issue: 2, Pages: 475-488
Further subjects:B Collective Action
B Sociality
B shared agency
B interpersonal obligation
B Experimental philosophy
B positive program
B collective intention
B joint intention
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Description
Summary:This paper argues that a class of popular views of collective intention, which I call “quasi-psychologism”, faces a problem explaining common intuitions about collective action. Views in this class hold that collective intentions are realized in or constituted by individual, mental, participatory intentions. I argue that this metaphysical commitment entails persistence conditions that are in tension with a purported obligation to notify co-actors before leaving a collective action attested to by participants in experimental research about the interpersonal normativity of collective action. I then explore the possibilities open to quasi-psychologists for responding to this research.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-021-10188-2