A Heideggerian Development of Scotus’s Christology: Why Christ Is Not a Human Person
John Duns Scotus offers a double negation theory of why the singularized human nature assumed by Christ is not a human person. However, for reasons discussed in this study, Scotus’s double negation theory is unsatisfactory. To fill the lacuna in Scotus’s account of human personhood, I explore conver...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Sage
2010
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| In: |
Irish theological quarterly
Year: 2010, Volume: 75, Issue: 3, Pages: 273-286 |
| Further subjects: | B
Incarnation
B Heidegger B Ontology B Nullity B Scotus B Personhood |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | John Duns Scotus offers a double negation theory of why the singularized human nature assumed by Christ is not a human person. However, for reasons discussed in this study, Scotus’s double negation theory is unsatisfactory. To fill the lacuna in Scotus’s account of human personhood, I explore convergences between Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Dasein and Scotus’s metaphysics of essential order. Heidegger’s ontological analysis allows for a more satisfying explanation of a human person as a kind of intrinsic ‘nullity’ that can also be reconciled with Christian theology. I also consider how this Heideggerian development of Scotus’s Christology might be extended to divine persons, and I defend it from certain objections. |
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| ISSN: | 1752-4989 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Irish theological quarterly
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/0021140010368512 |