Anti-Discrimination Law, Religious Organizations, and Justice
In many jurisdictions the list of factors for which anti-discrimination law applies has been expanded to include sexual orientation. As a result, moral and legal difficulties have arisen for religious organizations whose basic beliefs include the belief that sexual acts between persons of the same s...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2014
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Στο/Στη: |
New blackfriars
Έτος: 2014, Τόμος: 95, Τεύχος: 1060, Σελίδες: 727-738 |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Sexual Orientation
B Finnis B anti-discrimination law B Freedom Of Religion B Religious Organizations |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | In many jurisdictions the list of factors for which anti-discrimination law applies has been expanded to include sexual orientation. As a result, moral and legal difficulties have arisen for religious organizations whose basic beliefs include the belief that sexual acts between persons of the same sex are immoral. In light of these difficulties, is anti-discrimination law of this sort unjust? Recently John Finnis has argued that, as commonly applied, such anti-discrimination law is disproportionate and therefore unjust. In this essay, I critically examine Finnis's argument, and argue that, on account of the conception of disproportionateness that is employed, it does not succeed. So as to enable the argument from disproportionateness to succeed, I develop and defend a modified conception of disproportionateness. |
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ISSN: | 1741-2005 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: New blackfriars
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/nbfr.12062 |