Anti-Discrimination Law, Religious Organizations, and Justice
In many jurisdictions the list of factors for which anti-discrimination law applies has been expanded to include sexual orientation. As a result, moral and legal difficulties have arisen for religious organizations whose basic beliefs include the belief that sexual acts between persons of the same s...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado em: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2014
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Em: |
New blackfriars
Ano: 2014, Volume: 95, Número: 1060, Páginas: 727-738 |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
Sexual Orientation
B Finnis B anti-discrimination law B Freedom Of Religion B Religious Organizations |
Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Resumo: | In many jurisdictions the list of factors for which anti-discrimination law applies has been expanded to include sexual orientation. As a result, moral and legal difficulties have arisen for religious organizations whose basic beliefs include the belief that sexual acts between persons of the same sex are immoral. In light of these difficulties, is anti-discrimination law of this sort unjust? Recently John Finnis has argued that, as commonly applied, such anti-discrimination law is disproportionate and therefore unjust. In this essay, I critically examine Finnis's argument, and argue that, on account of the conception of disproportionateness that is employed, it does not succeed. So as to enable the argument from disproportionateness to succeed, I develop and defend a modified conception of disproportionateness. |
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ISSN: | 1741-2005 |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: New blackfriars
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/nbfr.12062 |