A Problem for Dialogue: Can World-Views be Rational?
This paper explores Otto Muck's metaphysical concept of Weltanschauung (world-view). My objective is to argue that world-views can be rational. To this end, I will first explain the notion of Weltanschauung and illustrate its relation to metaphysical convictions. Next, I will defend the meaning...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2019
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| Dans: |
New blackfriars
Année: 2019, Volume: 100, Numéro: 1087, Pages: 284-298 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Dialogue
B Rationality B word-view B Otto Muck B Vision du monde |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | This paper explores Otto Muck's metaphysical concept of Weltanschauung (world-view). My objective is to argue that world-views can be rational. To this end, I will first explain the notion of Weltanschauung and illustrate its relation to metaphysical convictions. Next, I will defend the meaningfulness of metaphysical assertions against two objections relating to verification and falsification. The core of the paper focuses on the integrative function of world-views and the criteria according to which one can evaluate their rationality, in particular, Frederick Ferré’s criteria for the rationality of metaphysical systems. The thesis is that the rationality of a world-view can be evaluated in terms of the adequacy of the integrative function it performs. Finally, I will show why, within Muck's framework, dialogue between proponents of different world-views is a postulate of rationality. |
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| ISSN: | 1741-2005 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: New blackfriars
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/nbfr.12328 |