A Problem for Dialogue: Can World-Views be Rational?

This paper explores Otto Muck's metaphysical concept of Weltanschauung (world-view). My objective is to argue that world-views can be rational. To this end, I will first explain the notion of Weltanschauung and illustrate its relation to metaphysical convictions. Next, I will defend the meaning...

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Autor principal: Kopf, Simon Maria ca. 21. Jh. (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
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Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell 2019
En: New blackfriars
Año: 2019, Volumen: 100, Número: 1087, Páginas: 284-298
Otras palabras clave:B Dialogue
B Rationality
B word-view
B Visión de mundo
B Otto Muck
Acceso en línea: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Descripción
Sumario:This paper explores Otto Muck's metaphysical concept of Weltanschauung (world-view). My objective is to argue that world-views can be rational. To this end, I will first explain the notion of Weltanschauung and illustrate its relation to metaphysical convictions. Next, I will defend the meaningfulness of metaphysical assertions against two objections relating to verification and falsification. The core of the paper focuses on the integrative function of world-views and the criteria according to which one can evaluate their rationality, in particular, Frederick Ferré’s criteria for the rationality of metaphysical systems. The thesis is that the rationality of a world-view can be evaluated in terms of the adequacy of the integrative function it performs. Finally, I will show why, within Muck's framework, dialogue between proponents of different world-views is a postulate of rationality.
ISSN:1741-2005
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: New blackfriars
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/nbfr.12328