SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE: A REJOINDER TO DEAN STRETTON
In this article, I reply to criticisms of Dean Stretton of the pro-life argument from substantial identity. When the criterion for the right to life proposed by most proponents of the pro-life position is rightly understood – being a person, a distinct substance of a rational nature – this position...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2007
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In: |
Bioethics
Year: 2007, Volume: 21, Issue: 2, Pages: 93-97 |
Further subjects: | B
natural capacity
B accidental property B Substance B developed capacity B Human embryo |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | In this article, I reply to criticisms of Dean Stretton of the pro-life argument from substantial identity. When the criterion for the right to life proposed by most proponents of the pro-life position is rightly understood – being a person, a distinct substance of a rational nature – this position does not lead to the difficulties Stretton claims it does. |
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ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00529.x |