SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE: A REJOINDER TO DEAN STRETTON
In this article, I reply to criticisms of Dean Stretton of the pro-life argument from substantial identity. When the criterion for the right to life proposed by most proponents of the pro-life position is rightly understood – being a person, a distinct substance of a rational nature – this position...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Загрузка...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Опубликовано: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2007
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| В: |
Bioethics
Год: 2007, Том: 21, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 93-97 |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
natural capacity
B Эмбрион B accidental property B Substance B developed capacity |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | In this article, I reply to criticisms of Dean Stretton of the pro-life argument from substantial identity. When the criterion for the right to life proposed by most proponents of the pro-life position is rightly understood – being a person, a distinct substance of a rational nature – this position does not lead to the difficulties Stretton claims it does. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00529.x |