Moral rights and the meaning of torture: a response to Nigel Biggar
This article challenges Nigel Biggar’s claim that there are no natural moral rights. Focusing on Biggar’s analysis of torture, I argue that he does not give adequate consideration to the possibility of intrinsically wrong actions. This oversight not only leads to a problematic, consequentialist anal...
Главный автор: | |
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Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
Язык: | Английский |
Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Опубликовано: |
SAGE Publishing
2021
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В: |
Anglican theological review
Год: 2021, Том: 103, Выпуск: 4, Страницы: 409-415 |
Другие ключевые слова: | B
Human Rights
B Torture B Moral Theology B natural rights B Consequentialism |
Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Итог: | This article challenges Nigel Biggar’s claim that there are no natural moral rights. Focusing on Biggar’s analysis of torture, I argue that he does not give adequate consideration to the possibility of intrinsically wrong actions. This oversight not only leads to a problematic, consequentialist analysis of torture—it also weakens his argument against the possibility of absolute rights. |
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ISSN: | 2163-6214 |
Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Anglican theological review
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/00033286211029664 |