Moral rights and the meaning of torture: a response to Nigel Biggar
This article challenges Nigel Biggar’s claim that there are no natural moral rights. Focusing on Biggar’s analysis of torture, I argue that he does not give adequate consideration to the possibility of intrinsically wrong actions. This oversight not only leads to a problematic, consequentialist anal...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
SAGE Publishing
2021
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| Στο/Στη: |
Anglican theological review
Έτος: 2021, Τόμος: 103, Τεύχος: 4, Σελίδες: 409-415 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Human Rights
B Torture B Moral Theology B natural rights B Consequentialism |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | This article challenges Nigel Biggar’s claim that there are no natural moral rights. Focusing on Biggar’s analysis of torture, I argue that he does not give adequate consideration to the possibility of intrinsically wrong actions. This oversight not only leads to a problematic, consequentialist analysis of torture—it also weakens his argument against the possibility of absolute rights. |
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| ISSN: | 2163-6214 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Anglican theological review
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/00033286211029664 |