Moral rights and the meaning of torture: a response to Nigel Biggar
This article challenges Nigel Biggar’s claim that there are no natural moral rights. Focusing on Biggar’s analysis of torture, I argue that he does not give adequate consideration to the possibility of intrinsically wrong actions. This oversight not only leads to a problematic, consequentialist anal...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
SAGE Publishing
2021
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Dans: |
Anglican theological review
Année: 2021, Volume: 103, Numéro: 4, Pages: 409-415 |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Human Rights
B Torture B Moral Theology B natural rights B Consequentialism |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Résumé: | This article challenges Nigel Biggar’s claim that there are no natural moral rights. Focusing on Biggar’s analysis of torture, I argue that he does not give adequate consideration to the possibility of intrinsically wrong actions. This oversight not only leads to a problematic, consequentialist analysis of torture—it also weakens his argument against the possibility of absolute rights. |
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ISSN: | 2163-6214 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Anglican theological review
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/00033286211029664 |